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Abstract
In this paper, two software-based architectures for providing fail-silent processes, Voltan and Chameleon
ARMORs, are analyzed using fault injection. The goal is to compare the fail-silence coverage provided
by the internal error detection techniques in Chameleon ARMORs with an ideal case of full duplication
provided by Voltan.
Rather than providing fault tolerance through redundant customized hardware, Voltan and Chameleon
take the alternate approach of providing fail-silence in software using “off-the-shelf” hardware compo-
nents. Voltan uses duplicated processes to provide the abstraction of a fail-silent node running on a con-
ventional processor. Chameleon supports a range of execution modes including replication and a variety
of error detection techniques to provide node and process fail-silence. The goal of this study is to com-
pare only the self-checking features of Chameleon ARMORs (i.e., ARMORs provided with the internal
detection techniques) with full duplication in Voltan.
The paper presents results from three different injection campaigns with two applications: Fast Fourier
Transform and the radix sort.
The first campaign to exercise the specific detection techniques in each system yielded a fail-silence
coverage of 100% for Voltan and 99.5% for Chameleon ARMORs. The second campaign, where injection
was done to areas not directly protected by any detection technique, gave a coverage of 43.3% for Voltan
and 45.8% for Chameleon ARMORs. The third campaign, where random injections were done to the
heap, stack, and code segments of the application processes, showed Voltan to be fail-silent 97.5% of the
time and Chameleon ARMORs 84.6% or the time.
In addition to providing an assessment of the fail-silence achieved by the two systems, the study also
gives insights into the issues in comparing systems with different designs, implementations, and assump-
tions, through fault injection experiments.
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1. Introduction
A common assumption made in software-implemented fault tolerance mechanisms, such as message
logging, checkpointing, and process replication, is that the processing elements will suffer only crash
failures, i.e., a processing element will either perform correct state transitions or will cease to function
and become silent. To meet this assumption in a realistic manner, some form of self-checking facility
is required within an element to detect a faulty state transition and stop the element from producing any
further outputs. Field studies have also shown that in a distributed environment executing on off-the-
shelf hardware components, the fail-silence assumption can be violated [21]. We define the fail-silence
property as producing the proper output, a detectably invalid output, or no output.
In this paper, two software-based architectures for providing fail-silent processes, Voltan [5] and Chameleon
ARMORs [7]

, are analyzed. Voltan uses replicated processes and a voting algorithm between processes
to provide fail-silence. The Chameleon design supports a range of execution modes including replication
and a variety of error detection techniques to provide node and process fail-silence. We examine the
Chameleon ARMORs which have been provided with a set of internal detection mechanisms to achieve
the self-checking property without duplicating ARMORs. We call such ARMORs self-checking AR-
MORs. The goal of this study is to compare the fail-silence coverage provided by the internal error de-
tection techniques in Chameleon ARMORs with the ideal full duplication case provided by Voltan.
To analyze the fail-silence of each system, we used a fault injection based approach. NFTAPE [20], a
tool for composing and executing fault injection experiments in a distributed environment, was used to
injected faults. Besides using traditional single-event upset faults (such as memory bit flips), the study
used a set of faults specific to each system (e.g., corruptions in specific message queues of Voltan).
The experiments illustrate (a) the strengths and weaknesses of each approach (process duplication and
self-checking ARMORs) and (b) the difficulties involved in applying fault injection to compare two very
different systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes other research on fail-silent nodes
and their validation. Section 3 provides background information on Voltan and Chameleon. Section 4

ARMORs (Adaptive Reconfigurable Mobile Objects for Reliability) are the functional modules in the Chameleon envi-
ronment, each executing as a separate process.

Results from TMR execution in an earlier Chameleon implementation are provided in [7].
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describes our validation methodology. Section 5 presents the results of our experiments. Section 6 dis-
cusses the issues in comparing Voltan and Chameleon and provides performance measures. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
A fail-silent node that uses replicated processing with comparison/voting must incorporate mecha-
nisms to keep its replicas synchronized, to avoid the states of the replicas from diverging. Synchronization
at the level of processor micro-instructions is logically the most straight forward way to achieve replica
synchronism. Such hardware-based designs are increasingly expensive and difficult to implement. Hence
there has been much interest in providing fail-silent nodes through software.
The task/process level synchronization approach used in Voltan was pioneered by the designers of the
Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) failure-masking node [24]. In SIFT, an application process
is structured as a set of cooperative cyclic tasks. Each task performs a deterministic computation. The
execution of a particular iteration of a task consists of inputting data (possibly generated by previous
iteration of other tasks), processing the data, and outputting results. Fault tolerance is achieved by voting
on the input data. Thus, task replicas must be synchronized at the beginning of each iteration (start of
a frame). Because of its application-dependent design, the SIFT architecture can only be applied to a
restricted range of applications. This is also the case for the VOTRICS system [22], which follows the
design principles of SIFT to provide fault tolerance in a different, but still specific, class of applications
(railway signaling systems).
There has always been concern over the performance of software-implemented fault-tolerant middle-
ware caused by the overheads imposed by redundancy management protocols. In SIFT, for instance, re-
dundancy management protocols can consume as much as 80% of the processor throughput[15]. Hybrid
solutions have been proposed to circumvent this problem. MAFT[9], FTP-AP[12], and Delta-4[16], hy-
brid architectures structured around a micro-instruction-synchronized hard core on top of which conven-
tional processors are replicated. The micro-instruction-synchronized hard core is responsible for execut-
ing redundancy management functions (e.g., message voting). This improves performance; however, the
hard core reintroduces the problems of associated with the hardware-implemented nodes.
The MARS architecture[18, 11] uses a combination of special-purpose hardware (e.g., comparators)
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and software approaches (e.g., double execution) to provide fault tolerance. Karlsson et al. [8] used three
different physical fault injectors to assess the coverage of error detection mechanisms in this system. They
found that the hardware and software mechanisms provided 98.7% coverage without duplicated execu-
tion. A software injection study for the same system [6] turned up surprisingly different results about the
efficiency of the different detection techniques. It showed fail-silence of 85% without application-level
detection mechanisms, with the coverage becoming perfect when application specific data consistency
and other checks were added.
Fault injection has been recognized as an important tool in the dependability validation process, both
for fault removal and fault forecasting [1]. Avresky [3] proposed a framework to guide the generation of
fault injection tests, to help developers remove fault from their designs. Arlat [2] used fault injection to
evaluate the fail-silence of a multicast protocol in Delta-4. Karlsson [8] compared three different meth-
ods of physical fault injection. Koopman [10] compared the robustness of 13 different POSIX operating
systems by testing their system calls and C library calls. Tsai [23] compared the reliability of a two gen-
erations of Tandem’s TMR-based prototype machines. Madeira et al. [14] used physical fault injection to
test the built-in detection techniques of two processors: Z80 and MC68K. No previous study, however,
has employed fault injection to compare different software-implemented fail-silence or fault tolerance
schemes.
The benefits of this study are twofold:
1. The experiments and results clearly expose the strengths and weaknesses of each approach: process
duplication and self-checking ARMORs.
2. They also illustrate the difficulties in comparing systems via a common fault injection campaign.
The insights obtained are important in developing a dependability benchmark for computer sys-
tems.
3. System Descriptions
This section describes the fundamentals of the two target systems to provide the reader with basics of
the systems operate. More detailed descriptions of Voltan and Chameleon can be found in [5, 4] and [7],
respectively.
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3.1. Voltan
Voltan assumes that a failed process can exhibit Byzantine behavior but that each non-faulty process
can sign a message it sends by affixing the message with a message-dependent, unforgeable signature. A
non-faulty process is assumed to be able to authenticate any message it receives. The computation per-
formed by a process is assumed to be deterministic. Furthermore, processes are distributed and commu-
nicate by passing messages. So, if non-faulty replicas have identical initial states, then they will produce
identical output messages, provided (a) all the non-faulty replicas of a process receive identical input
messages and (b) all the non-faulty replicas process the messages in an identical order.
To meet the property of fail-silence, a single logical process is formed from two replicas. As each
replica forms an output message, it signs that message and passes a copy to its partner. Upon receiving
a signed output message, the replica compares it with the locally generated result. If the comparison is
successful, the replica adds a second signature and outputs the message. If a comparison fails, the process
signals the error and halts to prevent the error from propagating. Hence, a fail-silent Voltan process will
output either correct messages or, detectably incorrect messages (these messages can be signed at most
once).
The method of operation for a fail-silent process pair is shown in Figure 1. The ‘Voltan system’ consists
of five cooperating threads on each node (Recv., Comp., Send, RX, and TX). The processes in the process
pair are called the Leader and the Follower. The leader’s receiver thread (Recv) accepts authentic double
signed messages and places them into the application’s Delivered Message Queue (DMQ) while sending a
copy to the follower. The application threads select a message from DMQ, process the message, and form
an output message. A copy of this message is signed and transmitted to the other replica. The unsigned
message is stored locally in the Internal Candidate Message Pool (ICMP). When the Reception thread
(RX) receives a singly signed message it places it in the External Candidate Message Pool (ECMP). The
Comparison thread (Comp) compares messages from ICMP and ECMP. If the comparison succeeds, the
message from the ECMP is signed again and the doubly signed message is placed into the Voted Message
Queue (VMQ); otherwise the replica terminates to prevent any error from propagating. Finally, the Send
thread picks up messages from the VMQ and dispatches them to their destinations.
The follower process also contains a mechanism to ensure that if a correctly functioning leader misses
receiving a valid message for processing but the follower does receive that message then the message gets
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Figure 1. The Structure of a Fail-Silent Process
ordered and processed by the pair.
3.2. Chameleon ARMORs
The Chameleon environment provides a means for constructing reliable distributed application around
ARMOR (Adaptive Reconfigurable Mobile Objects for Reliability) processes. ARMORs communicate
through message passing and can be installed on any node in the Chameleon network. They are built
from replaceable components called elements and compounds.
Elements constitute the most basic functional unit of the ARMOR and can be replaced during runtime,
thus allowing the ARMOR process to adapt to changing application requirements. Elements are passive
objects that are invoked to perform specific operations (such as taking a checkpoint) by messages; each
incoming message spawns a new thread of execution within the ARMOR process. Messages contain one
or more message operations, each operation invoking a specific function in one or more elements within
the ARMOR.
An ARMOR can be constructed to function as an application by designing elements to perform the
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functions of the application. When implementing a distributed application as an ARMOR, communica-
tion between the nodes uses the normal Chameleon infrastructure.
In addition to the application ARMORs, the Chameleon environment consists of several other AR-
MORs that help ensure system availability. Briefly, daemon ARMORs are installed on each node to
launch and manage other ARMORs on the node, to oversee them, and to route messages between them.
Managers (e.g., the Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM)) oversee specific ARMORs and are responsible for
recovering from failures in their subordinates. In the context of applications, a manager installs the re-
quired number of application ARMORs on various nodes. The manager only intercedes when the process
needs to be stopped, such as when migrating an application ARMOR to a different node, while a coop-
erating ARMOR undergoes reconfiguration, or when recovering from a checkpoint.
Chameleon divides its error detection mechanisms into several levels [25]. A level is denoted lower
than another if it is implemented more closely to the ARMOR being monitored. Level 1, the lowest level,
consists of detecting errors within the ARMOR. Level 2 consists of detection by the daemon installed
on the same node as the ARMOR. The same daemon is responsible for monitoring all locally installed
ARMORs. Levels 1 and 2 interact to provide error containment within the local node and to ensure the
abstraction of fail-silent processes and nodes, respectively. Levels 3 and 4 involve distributed detection
protocols among replicas or pseudo-replicas of ARMORs, possibly executing on different nodes; these
levels are not considered for this paper. Table 1 lists the available techniques. It should be noted that the
ARMOR architecture is designed to support both control flow and data signatures. There are two types
of data checks in Chameleon: data signatures, which are based on replicated information being present in
multiple elements, and data audits, which have been used by Liu [13] in the design of a high-availability
mobile telephone network controller. However, these checks were not implemented for the application
environment under test in this paper.
Detection Mechanism Level Description
Livelock Detection 1 Checks timeout on mutex lock
Coarse-grained I/O Signature 1 Checks pattern of I/O message types against prescribed set of
valid sequences
Fine-grained Control Signature 1 Checks runtime control flow against valid control flow paths
Text-segment Signature 1 Periodically checks signature of text segment pages
Crash Failure Detection 2 Detects abnormal process termination
Timing Failure Detection 2 Timeout on messages
Table 1. Error Detection Mechanisms in Chameleon ARMORs
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4. Dependability Assessment
To validate the fail-silent properties of the two target systems (Voltan and Chameleon), we have run
several different fault injection campaigns. The goals of these campaigns vary. The first campaign was
used to verify that the systems properly handles faults they were designed to handle (for example, Voltan
should still operate correctly when a message is dropped). The second campaign was meant to expose the
vulnerable parts of the system’s design (for example, data corruption in Chameleon). The last campaign
tested the fail-silence of the processes in a more general sense by injecting random faults, such as random
memory corruptions into the process stack and heap.
4.1. Target Applications
The first issue to be addressed is the mode in which each environment (Voltan and Chameleon AR-
MORs) is to be executed. In Voltan, the application needs to be modified by replacing communication
functions and adding initialization functions to execute as a replicated process. A Voltan process called
Nizam oversees the process’s initialization.
In Chameleon, the ARMORs can support applications in three different ways:
1. The application runs in a replicated, checkpoint-recovery, or any other application-dependent mode.
In this mode, Chameleon has little role to play in error detection or recovery in the application.
2. The application runs as an Embedded ARMOR, wherein the ARMORs provide error detection and
recovery to the application, but the application messages are not routed through the ARMORs.
3. The application is modified to run as a full-fledged ARMOR. This is the most intrusive mode of
operation.
Recall that our goal is to compare self-checking ARMORs and process duplication in Voltan. The third
mode of operation, is the only one in which Chameleon operates in a configuration that is reasonably
comparable with the Voltan configuration.
To test the systems, two simple and well-known target applications Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and
radix sort are run on a pair of nodes. Each application is parallelized into exactly two tasks and executes
on a distributed network of workstations or PCs. The choice of these applications was primarily based
on what was available “off-the-shelf” and could easily be implemented on both the systems so that the
evaluation could be based on the same workloads.
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The first program is a version of the FFT, a common algorithm for several scientific applications, such
as signal processing. In our implementation (based on [17]), the algorithm runs in
  	 
   
iterations,
where each iteration performs    parallel operations (the transform operates on an array of complex
numbers with  elements). The master node reads the input file from disk. For each iteration after the
first one, (a) a copy of the array is sent to the slave node, (b) the operations are divided evenly among the
two nodes, and (c) the slave node sends a copy of the array back to the master. For the experiments, we
used a 4096 element input array.
The radix sort algorithm is a linear time integer sorting algorithm. For the

th iteration, the algorithm
partitions the data based on whether the  th least significant bit is 0 or 1. To parallelize the algorithm,
each node finds a different partition (the master finds the 0’s and the slave finds the 1’s). The slave node
may send a different number of bytes on each iteration, depending upon the size of its partition. Unlike
the FFT, every data value transmitted is processed. For the experiments, we sorted a 10000 element array.
4.2. Fault Injectors
In this set of experiments, we use two basic classes of fault injectors. The first class injects traditional
single event upsets to the target process’s memory (heap (data), stack, and text (code) segments). Because
this class uses a simple, easy-to-understand fault model that applies to any system, it is a good choice from
which to build the basis of our comparison. The second class uses what is called program-specific fault
injectors. This class of injectors includes those that inject faults from functions within the target program.
Using such an injector, faults can be tailored toward the specific implementation (e.g., perform message
corruptions in Voltan when the messages are in the Delivered Message Queue or corrupt the control fields
in the ARMOR messages). The specific faults that were injected are described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
The message queues in Voltan appear to be a vulnerable component, since most of the work in Voltan
for providing fail-silence is processed in them. The effect of corrupting the queues will resemble timing
errors or event ordering errors between nodes, which are common causes of errors in agreement proto-
cols. Thus, we are interested in the effect of corrupting the queues with faults such as dropping queued
messages, reordering messages, inserting duplicate messages, and corrupting messages. In particular, the
DMQ and the VMQ queue (shown Figure 1) may be most vulnerable, since they send messages directly
to the application or to the other node.
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To support these corruptions, only a few simple modifications to the Voltan application library were
needed. First, methods were added to the Queue class: FiDrop(), FiReorder(), FiDuplicate(), and Fi-
Modify() (which respectively popped a message form the queue, reordered two adjacent messages in the
queue, duplicated a message in the queue, and corrupted the contents of a message). Next, a function was
added that takes a string describing a fault (the name of a queue and the type of fault) as input and calls
the appropriate fault method (from the four faults above). Next, in order to access this function, a simple
class was added that opens a named pipe (e.g., a Unix socket) to wait for trigger events. At this point,
any program can inject a fault by writing a message to the named pipe.
In Chameleon, the ARMOR processes communicate the data and control through messages. Hence,
the fail-silence property of the system depends on the integrity of the messages being exchanged. There-
fore, we are interested in injecting faults that affect messages, such as message corruption, message drop,
and message duplication. To support this fault model, a fault injection element was added to the appli-
cation written as an ARMOR. Since the element executes as a thread within the same address space as
the target application, it has direct access to the application’s memory and messages. The fault injection
element can be triggered either by an internal timer or by sending a message from an external source on
a named pipe.
4.3. NFTAPE
NFTAPE [20] is a tool for conducting automated fault injection experiments. It provides an API for
writing simple fault injectors. These fault injectors are called light-weight fault injectors (LWFI) because
they do not need to include code for triggering faults or for logging results, as NFTAPE provides these
services. Simple triggers wait for events and then use API calls to send a trigger event to a LWFI or to
another trigger (to support a cascade of triggers). NFTAPE can compose new fault injection experiments
by interchanging LWFIs and triggers that use the NFTAPE API.
NFTAPE contains two main components: the Control Host and the Target Nodes. The Control Host,
which generally resides on a safe node, processes a file called a Campaign Script. This file provides
information about the global sequencing of events in a campaign (or set of runs), what processes need
to be execute, what parameters they take, and when to run or terminate the processes. These processes
can be target applications, monitors, triggers, fault injectors, acceptance tests, or other processes on the
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node. The Control Host also logs the results of the experiments (including output from NFTAPE and all
processes it runs) for off-line analysis.
Each Target Nodes (i.e., any node other than the Control Host), runs a program called the Process Man-
ager. This program executes all processes, monitors when they terminate, captures any I/O and processes
NFTAPE commands between any nodes or processes.
Four important features of NFTAPE facilitated these experiments:
1. the LWFI API (new fault injectors such as the program-specific fault injectors were easy to write),
2. process management (NFTAPE can start all the processes used in the experiment and clean them
up if the program terminates abnormally),
3. logging (the outputs from each process, including fault injector, trigger, and application, are logged
using the same format), and
4. automated experiment sequencing (the order of events such as the order in which processes run).
4.3.1. Configuring NFTAPE for Program-Specific Fault Injectors
It is often desirable to use program-specific information (such as the addresses of special data struc-
tures) to guide fault or error injection. One approach to doing this is to add functions to the program to
perform such injections. The disadvantage of this approach is that the programmer needs to include a
way to trigger the fault and log information about the injection parameters. But, with NFTAPE all of
these functions are provided by the API library.
To trigger the Voltan fault injection methods through the named pipe interface, a small program was
needed to receive NFTAPE triggers (a function provided in the NFTAPE API library). Figure 2 show
the complete Voltan fault injector. To inject memory faults, NFTAPE executes and triggers a preexisting
driver-based fault injector [20].
To trigger the fault injection elements in Chameleon through the named pipe interface, it uses an in-
terface program just like the one for Voltan. This small interface program to convert the NFTAPE API
format to Chameleon’s named pipe interface.
5. Experiments
The experimental evaluation of the fail-silence provided by Voltan and Chameleon was done through
three different campaigns.
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Figure 2. Program-Specific Fault Injector Example for Voltan
1. Campaign A stresses the available detection mechanisms in each system and assesses the effective-
ness of the specific techniques. For this campaign, directed message control flow and text segment
corruptions are performed in Chameleon, and message corruptions, reordering, drop, and duplica-
tion are done in Voltan.
2. Campaign B injects faults for which there is no direct available detection mechanism in the system.
This is meant to expose the worst-case scenarios in both system. For Chameleon ARMORs, this
campaign consists of injections after the self-checks have been done, and for Voltan, it consists of
injections where the faults are aliased by the signatures.
3. Campaign C injects random memory faults are injected instead of selecting faults based on features
of the system being examined. Faults are injected into the text, heap and stack of the executing
processes.
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Node 1
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Figure 3. Experimental Configuration for (a) Voltan and (b) Chameleon
Figure 3 show the configurations in which systems run. For both FFT and the radix sort, the applica-
tion is parallelized into two tasks, denoted as Master and Slave. In Voltan, each task is run as a duplicated
process: a Leader and a Follower. Thus, there are four application processes: Master Leader, Master
Follower, Slave Leader, and Slave Follower. In Chameleon, for the purpose of this study, duplication of
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processes was not used, and hence, there were only two application processes, Master and Slave, corre-
sponding to the two application tasks. In both systems, fault injection targets the application processes.
5.1. Campaign A: Assessment of Specific Detection Mechanisms
In this campaign, directed fault injection is done to stress and evaluate the effectiveness of the detection
techniques implemented in each system.
5.1.1. Voltan
As described in Section 4.2, we added the capability of injecting specific errors into the queues used by
Voltan to process messages. The faults injected were the modification of a message waiting in a queue,
the removal of a message from a queue, the addition of a duplicate of a message held in a queue, and
reordering pairs of messages held in a queue.
Initially these faults were injected by NFTAPE directly into a specific queue. It was found that if injec-
tions are performed at regular time intervals, then in the vast majority of cases, no messages are present
in the relevant queue. Therefore, instead of using a time-based trigger, we injected faults when messages
were pushed onto a particular queue; this guarantees that a message is always present when a fault is
injected.
The queues selected for injection were the Delivered Message Queue (DMQ) and the Voted Message
Queue (VMQ) of the slave processes of the radix sort and FFT applications. Errors in these queues rep-
resent faults arising when messages arrive and depart from the Voltan nodes. The results in Table 2 show
the effect of injecting the faults listed above into the given Voltan queues. No variations in behavior were
displayed between the 25 runs with 6 faults each while running the radix sort, and the same behavior was
observed for FFT.
Queue Reorder Drop Modify Duplicate
Leader DMQ Correct Fail-Silent Fail-Silent Correct
Follower DMQ Correct Fail-Silent Fail-Silent Correct
Leader VMQ Correct Correct Fail-Silent Correct
Follower VMQ Correct Correct Fail-Silent Correct
Table 2. Results from Campaign A for Voltan
Correct means that the program ran to completion and produced the expected results. Fail-Silent means that the
program stopped and failed to produce any results.
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The results show that Voltan provides 100% fail-silence coverage for this type of message injection.
Injections into the Leader and the Follower produced identical results. Nizam, the process that oversees
the application process’s initialization, is the only unprotected process in Voltan. It is only invoked at the
beginning and at the end of the application run. Faults are not injected into Nizam because it is likely to
crash.
5.1.2. Chameleon Self-Checking ARMORs
The results from Campaign A of the directed message injections into ARMORs are shown in Table 3.
In this campaign, program-specific fault injections are conducted. The injection is targeted at the control
fields of the ARMOR’s messages. This type of injection is meant to stress the coarse-grained signature
mechanism of ARMORs. The injection occurs after the message has been generated by the application
element but before the coarse-grained signature element has checked the message. This type of fault in-
jection cannot be time-triggered exactly, rather it is a hybrid of message-rate-based and time-based trig-
gering. In our implementation, the fault injection element attempted to inject a fault once per second; if
no message was present, the fault injector would set a flag to inject the next message(s).
Control-field Corruption Delay Drop
Result FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort
Good 0 0 0 20 0 2
Hang 3 2 0 0 1 0
L1 Detected 11 18 0 0 0 0
L2 Detected 15 10 30 10 29 28
Non-Fail-Silent 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30
Table 3. Results from Directed Message Control Field Injections in Chameleon
All the detection techniques in Levels 1 and 2 were active, but the L1 detections were all by the coarse-grained
signatures.
The results from Table 3 show that the coarse-grained signature is effective in all but one case of mes-
sage corruption. The important point is that in 35-60% of cases, the error is detected without a crash of
the process. The single case of non-fail-silent behavior observed with FFT resulted from the corruption
of the pointer field of one element of the linked list of message operations. As a result, the FFT applica-
tion skipped an operation on one element of the input data, and the output result differed from the golden
run for one data point. The message delay and drop either cause a good result or a process crash. Thus,
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all the cases are fail-silent. Radix sort (rsort) shows greater resilience to delayed and dropped messages
because of the native implementation.
Another set of injections was targeted at the text segment of the FFT and radix sort applications (only
results for FFT are presented). Random single-bit flips were injected into the text segment, which is pro-
tected through the text segment signature in Chameleon. The results of these injections are shown in
Table 4.
With Text Signature W/O Text Signature
Result Rand. Elem. FFT Tot. Rand. Elem. FFT Tot.
Good 0 0 0 0 16 5 7 28
Hang 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0
L1 Det. 24 20 22 66 0 0 0 0
L2 Det. 6 9 7 22 13 21 20 54
Non-Fail-Silent 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 8
Total 30 30 30 90 30 30 30 90
Table 4. Results from Chameleon Injection into the Text Segment for the FFT Application
Rand. means anywhere in the text segment, including elements that are used and unused; Elem. means into into
the text segment of the elements that are used, including the FFT element and a few other Chameleon
infrastructure elements; FFT means into the FFT element
All the elements in the Chameleon library (about 40) are statically linked into each ARMOR, though
the ARMOR may be using just a few elements from the library (e.g., FFT only uses three elements, in-
cluding the core FFT element). When randomly injecting over the entire text segment, the text segment
signature check always detected the error unless the fault caused the program to abort first. Since there
is such a large amount of dead code compiled into the text segment, targeting injections to code that is
more likely to execute provides a better idea of how effective the signature check is. To test this, we tar-
geted faults into the text segment’s pages that contained elements in use and into those of the application
element. The results from these injections, shown in Table 4 (columns “Elem.” and “FFT”), demonstrate
that the text segment signature is able to capture most of the faults and again not only prevent fail-silence
violations but also capture the error before a process crash. It can be seen that text segment signature
results in some false positives; that is, it signals an error when it detects a bit flip in the text segment,
though that fault may not otherwise have caused any error. As a result, there are no good runs with the
text signature turned on. To reduce the number of false positives, we have proposed a modification of the
text signature technique to flag an error only when the fault is in a page of the text segment that is being
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used or that is going to be used shortly.
5.2. Campaign B: Assessment of System Vulnerabilities
In this campaign, directed fault injection is done into areas for which no direct detection technique is
present in the system.
5.2.1. Voltan
The message injections described in Section 5.1.1 do not investigate the situation where a modified
message produces the same signature as the original message. This possibility can be made vanishingly
small by using digital signature techniques (e.g., [19]). However, the existing implementation uses only
a simple checksum in the range 0-255 to authenticate data. We investigated the effect of injecting an
error into messages that leave the signature unaltered. If corruption occurs within a message, there is a
1/256 chance of its being accepted as authentic by Voltan. We injected faults into the Delivered Message
Queue of the leader slave node. This represents the worst-case fault scenario in a Voltan node, where
corrupt messages have been processed by both leader and follower nodes. The results obtained are shown
in Table 5.
Result radix sort FFT Total
Correct Results 6 8 14
Fail-Silent Behavior 12 0 12
Non-Fail-Silent 12 22 34
Total 30 30 60
Table 5. Results of Injecting Message Faults into Voltan that Bypass Signature Checking
Correct Result means that the application completed and produced the correct results. Fail-Silent Behavior
includes any run that did not produce an output (either hanged or crashed due to an error). Non-Fail-Silent
includes runs that produced an incorrect output.
In 12 of the 22 runs of the FFT that produced incorrect results, all the output data were accurate to at
least 5 significant digits. In the radix sort, the incorrect results were always sorted but values had been
modified. One reason for the difference between the applications may be that the radix sort can detect
corrupt data if the size of each node’s partitions are different from the gold run. It can be seen that in
this scenario, fail-silent violations can occur, but there is still a significant chance (43%) that fail-silent
violations can be prevented.
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5.2.2. Chameleon Self-Checking ARMORs
The message injections in Section 5.1.2 do not investigate the situation in which the data field of a
message is corrupted. The purpose of Campaign B is to look at how ARMORs react to different kinds of
faults in the messages. In this case, faults were randomly injected into the entire message, both control
and data fields. In addition, duplicate messages were sent.
Duplicate Modify
Result FFT rsort FFT rsort Total
Good 0 4 0 2 6
Hang 2 0 0 0 2
L1 Det. 0 0 0 0 0
L2 Det. 9 14 16 8 47
Non-Fail-Silent 19 12 14 20 65
Total 30 30 30 30 120
Table 6. Results of Injecting Message Faults into Chameleon that Bypass Signature Checking
All the detection techniques in Levels 1 and 2 were active.
The results show that Chameleon ARMORs are susceptible to message duplication and message cor-
ruption. Message corruptions are done after the messages have passed all the intra-ARMOR checks.
Also, since both the applications are data-centric, application-specific messages consist primarily of data
(the size of the data is up to 64 times the size of the control). Therefore, random injections usually cor-
rupt the message data that are not protected in the current Chameleon implementation. While both data
audits to protect against data error and duplicate message checks have been implemented, they had not
been ported to the target environment at the time of the experiments.
Another set of injections is done to the application process’s heap data. Since the heap data is not
protected in the current Chameleon implementation, this class of injections also falls in the category of
exposing the system vulnerabilities. Results from this injection are presented in the column titled Heap
in Table 8.
5.3. Campaign C: Random Memory Faults
In this campaign, random memory faults are injected into the heap, stack, and text segments of the
application processes.
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5.3.1. Voltan
The campaign set tested the Voltan system against random memory faults (memory bit flips into the
text, stack, and heap sections of each of the test applications). Each combination of fault location and
application included 25 runs, with a fault rate of one fault per second. The results of each run are shown
in Table 7.
Heap Heap MF Heap LS Text Stack
Result FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort Total
Good 13 13 11 8 23 24 11 16 19 18 156
Hang 9 11 14 16 2 1 2 0 6 7 68
Seg. Fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 9 0 0 21
Non-Fail-Silent 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Total 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 250
Table 7. Results from Random Memory Bit Flips in Voltan
Runs Heap MF injected faults into the follower copy of the master process and runs Heap LS injected faults into
the leader copy of the slave process; otherwise, the leader copy of the master process was used
The heap injections provided interesting results. This is where most of the program data and the mes-
saging data are stored. For about half the runs, the program produced the correct output. In five runs
(three for FFT and two for the radix sort), the output from one of the nodes differed from the golden run
in exactly one data point. This probably happened because the fault corrupted a value between the time
it was received from another node and the time the value was written to file, or because the fault affected
data that was not used by the other node.
The heap injections were repeated on different nodes. Initially, faults were injected into the Master-
Leader. The results of these injections are given in Table 7 in columns marked Heap, Text and Stack.
To explore the impact of varying the fault injection target (i.e., whether it is the Leader or the Follower),
we performed two additional sets of fault injections, which targeted (1) the Master-Follower and (2) the
Slave-Leader. The results are given in Table 7 in columns marked Heap MF and Heap LS, respectively.
We observed that the choice among copies (Leader or Follower) had little effect–the number of incorrect
outputs was slightly lower for the Follower. However, faults injected into the Slave were much less likely
to manifest. A possible reason for this may be that the data on the Slave are only valid between the time
it receives the input and the time it sends the results; there are no live data while the Slave is waiting to
receive a message, as is the case for the Master.
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In all but 5 of the 250 (2.0%) runs, the program either produced the correct output (62%), hung (27%),
or aborted on a segmentation fault (8.4%). In each of these cases, the program either produced the correct
output or no output (fitting the definition of fail-silent).
Process duplication in Voltan protected an application from producing an error in 89 of the 94 runs
where a fault manifested by either hanging a node or crashing silently. (Presumably, the cases where a
node crashed would have also crashed if Voltan was not used.) Only 5.3% of these runs had errors that
escaped Voltan.
5.3.2. Chameleon Self-Checking ARMORs
The results from Campaign C for Chameleon are shown in Table 8. In this campaign, we examined the
effects of injecting random bit flips into the heap, stack, and text segment of a Chameleon ARMOR. In ad-
dition to the core application element, there are also a few Chameleon-specific elements in the ARMOR,
e.g., the named pipe management element for establishing communication with the local daemon, the
coarse and fine-grained signature elements, and the text segment signature element. In the experiments,
the heap injection is done to the entire ARMOR’s heap, the stack injection is done to every thread’s stack,
and the text injection is done to the text segment of the application element only.
Heap Stack Text Text w/o Sig. Total
Result FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort FFT rsort
Good 9 7 5 5 0 0 7 4 21 16
Hang 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4
L1 Det. 1 2 0 0 22 24 0 0 23 26
L2 Det. 2 2 24 25 7 6 20 26 53 59
Non-Fail-Silent 18 15 1 0 0 0 3 0 22 15
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 120 120
Table 8. Results from Random Memory Bit Flips in Chameleon
All the detection techniques in Levels 1 and 2 were active except in column 4 where text signature was turned off.
The results show a fail-silence coverage of 84.6% averaged over the two applications and using both
text segment injections (individually 87.5% and 81.7% for the radix sort and FFT respectively). A large
contribution of the fail-silence violations is from the heap injections. Removing the results of the heap
injections, the fail-silence coverage becomes 98.3%. This is understandable, since most of the data of
both FFT and the radix sort are allocated dynamically and reside in the heap. The signature mechanisms
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in the target implementation protect the text segment and control flow of the ARMORs, but they do not
provide any detection for the data.
As mentioned earlier, the application-supported data audits provide protection against data errors. In
addition, the ARMOR architecture supports data signature. The overall effectiveness of the two approaches
is yet to be evaluated experimentally. The basis behind the data signature is that multiple copies of the
internal state of ARMORs are available. Either there is explicit replication of elements within an AR-
MOR or there is naturally information in multiple elements within an ARMOR. For example, the set of
daemons in Chameleon is a subset of the set of ARMORs. These are maintained in separate elements in
the manager. The data signature is formed by a executing a hashing function on the shared internal state
and comparing it with the hashed value of the state at the alternate location(s). In the case of FFT or the
radix sort, the application element’s data is its state and will be protected by such a Data Signature. An-
other observation is that the text injection does not cause any control flow errors. If a control flow error
occurs, it is detected by the fine-grained signature.
6. Discussion
6.1. Difficulties Encountered Comparing the Two Systems
This study is the first we are aware of to compare the fail-silence achieved by two dissimilar software-
based approaches. We needed to resolve several issues in order to build a meaningful comparison.
1. Different Data Conventions. We needed to address the fact that each system had different data con-
ventions. We assumed that a simple fault model like random memory bit flips to the text, heap, and
stack regions would be a fair basis for measuring fails silence, but there are architectural differences
for each of these. The text segment in Chameleon includes code for a large library of elements that
were not used in this experiment. Thus, only a small fraction of the text faults affected code that
could be executed. This becomes a problem for injecting text segment faults because the text seg-
ment checker is more likely to catch random text faults before they manifest if they are in dead
code.
2. Platform Differences. Since both systems are multi-threaded, they contain several stacks instead
of just one. For each, we selected a thread and then an address within that thread’s stack. Using
20
this method, stack faults in Solaris’s thread implementation appeared to manifest more frequently
than in Linux’s. Since the choice of platform may affect the dependability of the programs running
on it, it makes sense to first understand the dependability issues for each platform. Future studies
need to look at the dependability of each of these platforms running the same application.
3. Fault Triggers. The fault trigger criterion is another issue that may lead to problems in fault injec-
tion comparison studies. The trigger in these experiments was time-based (one fault per second).
It is questionable whether a simple rate is always appropriate, since execution time in different
systems may differ greatly. For example, injecting one fault per second in a run that lasts for one
second will differ from doing so in a run that lasts for five seconds. When injecting message faults,
the timer trigger performed poorly because the fault injector often attempted to inject faults into an
empty message queue. It is not clear how to trigger message faults in different systems when the
systems have different message patterns.
4. Use of Multi-Threaded and Multi-Process Applications. As mentioned above, the stack fault model
is more complicated for these cases than in a single-threaded process. Both systems are multi-
process: Voltan uses a process called Nizam to locate services; Chameleon uses the Fault Tolerance
Manager (FTM) to oversee the daemons. While Nizam runs as a single unprotected process, the
FTM is an ARMOR with a variety of detection techniques. We did not inject faults into either of
these processes in this study, since neither process performs many actions while the application is
running. A more complete study may need to address how to test the reliability of these processes.
5. System-specific Fault Injection. Since many types of faults are very unlikely to be injected through
random fault injection, it is often necessary to accelerate faults injections. One way to do this is
to inject faults when the system is in a particular state (e.g., when the system is under high stress,
while components are recovering, while other nodes are sending messages). Another approach is
to inject specific faults which are likely to manifest, e.g., reordering messages on a queue. While
these approaches are good for learning about system, they complicate comparing different systems,
since the faults and triggers are specific to the program.
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6.2. Performance Overheads
An important consideration for using software fault tolerance is the overhead one pays for the fault
resilience. With a hardware solution, an application can run close to or at full speed, but software so-
lutions incur overheads in performing checks and in synchronization between nodes. Table 9 compares
the performance of the test applications running on the two systems and a baseline, non-fault-tolerant
version using TCP/IP. The TCP/IP version and the Chameleon version ran on a Sparc-Solaris platform
(140MHz Ultra processor), while the Voltan version ran on a Linux platform (233MHz Pentium proces-
sor). Each version removed debugging information (which was present in the other experiments). The
execution time includes the time spent in the main computational and communication loop, but it does
not include the time to input or output the data set. The overhead of the Chameleon execution results
from the inefficiency of its message operations when exchanging large messages (which was the case
with both applications) and from all the level 1 and level 2 detection techniques being active. Note that
the Chameleon architecture supports the activation of specific detection techniques on an as-needed basis.
Version FFT Radix Sort
Voltan 2.8 sec. 3.5 sec.
Chameleon 3.5 sec. 5.7 sec.
TCP/IP 1.4 sec. 1.8 sec.
Table 9. Performance Comparison
7. Conclusion
In this paper we examined two approaches for providing fail-silent nodes: (1) process replication with
voting, as used by Voltan and (2) internal self-checking mechanisms, as used by Chameleon ARMORs.
The goal of this comparison was to see if the self-checking method (without explicate duplication) can
achieve the same level of fault tolerance as process replication.
We used NFTAPE, a distributed fault injection, to assess the fail-silence of these two systems while ex-
ecuting one of two test applications, Fast Fourier Transform and the radix sort. The analysis was divided
into three campaigns:
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 The first campaign validated specific detection techniques in the systems and demonstrated almost
perfect coverage for both system.
 The second campaign measured the need for protection by injecting faults into areas which are not
directly protected by detection techniques. In both systems, about 45% of the fault injection runs
produced non-fail-silent behavior.
 The third campaign, used random memory bit flips into the heap, stack, and text segments of the ap-
plication processes. Voltan maintained fail-silence in 97.5% of the time, and Chameleon ARMORs
in 84.6% of the time.
Since both applications used in this experiment are data-centric, heap injections are very likely to cor-
rupt program data. Voltan provides a high coverage for this type of errors. It is likely that Chameleon
ARMORs would demonstrate a higher error coverage executing a control-centric application (such as
real-time control software). The fail-silence coverage obtained from the third campaign rose to 97.8%
by considering only stack and text injections.
The study also provided insight into the issues that need to be considered when comparing the depend-
ability of different systems. These include different data conventions, platform differences, different fault
triggers, and use of multi-threaded and multi-process applications. Despite these unresolved issues, the
experiments in this study were able to compare the two systems in terms of their fail-silence coverage.
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